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The current and previous
crises
The current crisis is only comparable in intensity to those of 1929
and 1973, apart from others originating from wars or catastrophes.
The collapse of stock exchanges is a general feature of any crisis,
out of simple logic. They also have all in common that they are the
result of errors done in economic policy, though different in every
case. Economic crisis is, in a way or another, linked to financial
crisis. The 1929 crisis was deflationary, the 1973 one inflationary,
and there are doubts about what the current one is. In the present
case, the efficacy of collaboration between governments and
international economic institutions will be put to the proof for the
first time. Recovering confidence is a previous step to solve
problems.
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Economic cycles
Economic cycles are a reality, although some
economists had considered them overcome a
few years ago in the light of bullish markets.
The Catalan, Spanish, European and global
economy has followed a path of growth in the
last two centuries, albeit irregular, like sawteeth.
After a period of expansion comes one of reces-
sion, usually the consequence of errors or
excess done in times of exaggerated optimism.
The bigger the errors or excess, the deeper a
crisis. However, in developed economies – of
which Catalonia is one – the starting point of a
new growth period is usually above that of the
previous economic cycle. The world is making
overall progress in spite of crises.
After a period of expansion comes one
of recession, usually the consequence
of errors or excess done in times of
exaggerated optimism.
Sawteeth, i.e. economic crises can be more or less
deep, more or less generalised or restricted to a
given geographical area, they may affect the
whole of the population or only some specific
sectors, they may be short-lived or last long. 
The economic crisis started in 2008 is deep and
generalised. If we intend to compare it to any
previous crisis having the same properties, we need
to go back to 1973 and 1929. However, we must
bear in mind that the 20th century, in which
these crises occurred, was unfortunately charac-
terised by the two big World Wars and a whole
set of geographically restricted wars, each of
which triggered a deep economic crisis, especially
among the vanquished. Nevertheless, the object
of this article is to deal with economic crises
caused by other reasons than military conflict, as
a result of ordinary human activity without the
use of weapons.
All economic crises show similarities in certain
points and differences in others. They all cause
recession – a temporary decline in GDP – or
depression – deeper recession – but differ in
time to recover normal parameters, the political
and social framework they develop in, the geo-
graphical area affected as well as measures
taken – or not – by governments and economic
institutions.
All recessions in the last centuries have been
related to a bearish stock exchange, the capital
market and most representative symbol of
investor confidence or distrust.
The 1929 crisis
In October 1929, Wall Street crashed. Stock
prices had been on an unstoppable rise since
1926, reaching levels that bore no relation with
the balance sheets of listed companies. Many
people had started investing in stock as a way
of making easy money, without having any
knowledge. It was not investment but specula-
tion with stock offering gains within days or
weeks. In this respect, there is a coincidence with
the years prior to the current crisis.
The October 1929 crash was a
consequence of stock investment
excess, emphasised by a latent
economic crisis.
The American stock exchange went down in an
uninterrupted way, till it reached its bottom in
late 1932. By then, quotations were down a
rough 80% related to October 1929 prices. In
the meanwhile the carpet of corporate accounting
truth had been lifted, showing that balance
sheets were clearly on the down. To put it simple,
the October 1929 crash was a consequence of
stock investment excess, emphasised by a latent
economic crisis. Also here we may find a point
of coincidence with the current crisis. The
American stock exchange started to recover in
1933, a development that was crushed in 1937
by another decline in quotations, which kept up
to the outbreak of World War II.
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The American stock exchange crisis unleashed
a financial one. Much of speculative stock
investment had been done on credit, so delin-
quency affected banks and their liquidity.
American banks claimed back their deposits
from European banks, and the crisis spread
over to Europe. In 1930, more than a hundred
small and medium-sized American banks went
bankrupt. The first European bank to close was
Vienna-based Creditanstalt in May 1931, fol-
lowed by many German banks.
The 1929 crisis was deflationary, with a general
price decline and implementation of protectionist
policies by governments, which led to consider-
able world trade contraction and misery. This
misery is masterly described in the first films by
Charlie Chaplin. To find a way out of the crisis,
many political meetings and international con-
ferences were held, but lack of cohesion among
the main powers was absolute. There was no
international cooperation. This only worked 
for the first time in history after World War II
with the Marshall Plan.
In Europe, the misery of the German people,
aggravated by reparations for World War I
imposed by the winners, led to the rise to
power of Nazism by democratic means (1933).
In Italy, the fascist regime had seized power in
1922, though not so democratically. The United
States government, as Hitler and Mussolini did,
went for interventionist policy advocating
 public expenditure to surmount the crisis: this
was the «New Deal». In 1933, Mussolini’s Italy
created the Istituto di Ricostruzione Industriale
(Institute of Industrial Reconstruction, IRI),
which was the model by which Francoist Spain
created the Instituto Nacional de Industria
(National Institute of Industry, INI) in 1941.
Global economic crisis reached Catalonia in 
a moment of change of political regime. The
Second Republic – proclaimed in May 1931 –
was enthusiastically accepted by most of the
population, but the difficult economic setting
did not facilitate its consolidation. In July 1931,
the Banc de Catalunya suspended payments
and the Barcelona City Council stopped paying
out its debt coupon. Two examples of financial
crisis: «The fall of the Banc de Catalunya – a
mixed, commercial and industrial bank – is the
reflection in Spain – and more specifically in its
most industrialised regions – of one of the most
distressful times in modern capitalism.»1 It is
in the most developed areas like Catalonia
where the impact of the crisis was most felt; in
Andalusia, misery was permanent anyway.
The moderate policy implemented by the dif-
ferent Spanish Republican governments and
the restoration of the Government of Catalonia
(the Generalitat) did not satisfy neither the
working class, radicalised by very powerful
anarchist movements, nor the bourgeoisie,
which saw that the economic situation had 
cut their benefits. The outcome was the Civil
War and a long dictatorship that did not 
show any sign of economic rationality at least
before 1959.
The 1973 crisis
There are considerable differences in setting the
beginning and the end of this long-running
international crisis. To some, it started with the
oil price surge starting in 1973. Between late
January 1973 and January 1974, it multiplied by
5.7. But also here, deep underlying economic
problems were stated, so the oil price did noth-
ing else than trigger this situation.
Also here, deep underlying economic
problems were stated, so the oil price
did nothing else than trigger this
situation.
It took a long time before Spain became aware
of this global crisis. In December 1973, prime
minister Luis Carrero Blanco was assassinated,
and economic concerns became secondary. 
Politics were given priority: the country was
turning to terrorism in the Basque Country, the
dictator’s health, his foreseeable death and 
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the unforeseeable political future. Spain was the
only European country where petrol consumption
went on increasing in 1974 and no retainment
measures were taken. General Franco died in
November 1975, and a complex political transi-
tion started. It was not a good moment to take
economic decisions, which the rest of European
countries had already taken, allowing them to
see the light in the end of the tunnel much
earlier than Spain. Here, the first measures
were taken only in 1977, with Enrique Fuentes
Quintana as deputy prime minister in charge
of economic affairs in a government led by
Adolfo Suárez: devaluation of the peseta
by 20%, a first tax reform and monetary and
fiscal measures.
By signing the so-called Moncloa pact, the new
political parties and trade unions accepted a
truce in their political struggle until the crisis
would be under control. Reducing inflation
from 24.5% to 22% in 1978 and curbing credit
growth were immediate goals to achieve. 
As opposed to what happened in 1929, the
1973 crisis was clearly inflationary, but like 
the former, it occurred within a framework of
strong social unrest in Spain and a serious
industrial crisis in Catalonia.
The banking crisis began in 1978 with the
Banco de Navarra – one in many cases of
 speculative business that was all but rational –
and ended in 1993 with the collapse of the
Banco Español de Crédito. A total 62 banks
 suffered officially from its consequences, which
would have been worse if the Bank of Spain
had applied equal rules and criteria to all. The
result was a hardly spontaneous concentration
of banks on the negative side and reinforced
measures to control solvency of banks and savings
banks on the positive.
The 1973 crisis, which became apparent in
Spain only two or three years later, took 
longer to wear off here than in the rest of
developed countries. Its end was only felt in
1984 – an endless crisis, aggravated by political
transition to democracy, but fortunately with 
a happy end: a parliamentary monarchy.
Two relatively minor crises
Between the 1973 and 2008 crises there was a
recession in 1992-93 and a speculation bubble
in 2000. It is worth having a look at them as an
example of the reality of economic cycles and
sectorial bubbles.
Between 1992 and 1994, the Spanish
currency lost 35% of its value against
the Deutsche mark.
1992 was the year of the Barcelona Olympics, a
great event in the city and Catalonia. This often
pushes back the fact that the economic situa-
tion was not very bright then. Germany had
stopped being the engine of Europe as it was
trying to solve its problems created by reunifi-
cation with the eastern part of the country, and
all Europe suffered from it. In Spain, that year
ended with GDP growth at 1.1% but inflation
at 5.4% and unemployment at 20%. The Minister
of Economy, Carlos Solchaga, was implement-
ing a policy to defend the peseta through very
high interest rates: credit was at an 18% 
plus commissions. The situation became
unbearable, and between September and
November 1992, the Spanish government was
forced to devaluate the peseta twice: 5% and
6%, respectively.
1993 set an end to minister Solchaga’s economic
policy, with a third devaluation by 8%, marking
the end of a period defined by the Financial
Times as «machismo» (sic) in the system of 
setting the peseta exchange rate. For the 
first time, Spain was officially in a recession,
with GDP declining by 1%. Pedro Solbes
replaced then Carlos Solchaga as Minister 
of Economy.
1994 saw a recovery of the Catalan and Span-
ish economy led by the industry. The sounder
US economy, which spread over to Europe,
also had its influence. However, unemploy-
ment was stable at 23.9%, while inflation was
at 4.3%. It was the year of financial scandals,
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with Mariano Rubio, former Bank of Spain 
governor, and businessman Javier de la Rosa in
the headlines. But the peseta was still overvalued,
and another 7% devaluation took place in 1995.
In the end, the Spanish currency had lost 35%
of its value against the Deutsche mark.
The 20th century ended with growth decelera-
tion in the world economy and the burst of the
speculative bubble related to internet companies,
those called the «new economy». The clearest
example is Terra, a Telefónica subsidiary based
in Barcelona. Terra Networks was established in
1998. In late 1999, its shares were quoted at 11
euros. Then it merged with Lycos, one of the
main US internet portals, creating the third
largest internet group of the world, only behind
America Online and Yahoo! On 14 March 2000,
the Terra Lycos shares were quoted at 157.65
euros. That day marked the start of their decline,
which was as sudden as had been their rise,
eventually leaving the share price under the
 initial 11 euros by the end of the year, and with
company losses higher than that year’s turnover.
All internet companies went the same way.
The Spanish Ibex-35 stock exchange index
lost 21.75%, dragged down by «new economy»
stock. Going too fast is obviously very dangerous.
The 2008 crisis
A real estate crisis in the United States
– involving subprime loans – Spain and some
other European countries was already visible
in 2007, but nobody saw the financial and
 confidence crisis that became apparent in
mid 2008, nor that the US, British and other
European governments would agree on inter-
vening unmistakably in some big financial
institutions, against some enthusiastically
preached governmental principles of economic
liberalism. Once again it was stated, upon lifting
the carpet of real economy, that apart from real
estate sins acting as a trigger, there were some
others – especially financial ones – originating
in the United States but affecting the world
economy. These financial sins included just about
anything, from fraud to outrageous financial
products. If the 1929 stock and financial crash in
Wall Street took some years to reach Europe,
this time it got there within hours.
The current crisis came after a long period
of euphoria with low interest rates causing
strong leveraging of individuals and companies,
especially in our country. Meanwhile, the stock
exchange was growing, following a clearly
 parallel evolution to 1929. The crisis became 
 visible when the real estate bubble burst. But
American subprime loans had nothing to do
with the real estate and building crisis, which
affected heavily Catalonia but much more other
Spanish areas such as Madrid, the Costa del
Sol and Valencia. What we find here is excessive
housing building funded with credits that
 cannot be repaid upon maturity as sales have
dropped dramatically. The crisis affects big
companies and pushes the financial crisis.
The current crisis came after a long
period of euphoria with low interest
rates causing strong leveraging of
individuals and companies.
Financial organisations operating in Spain
had catered for disproportionate credit demand
with resources from the European interbank
 market, especially Germany, which had a surplus.
This is another distinctive feature of this crisis,
though not in its result. Those countries with a
surplus also had a market to serve and internal
problems. The reduction of this offer will thus
force Spanish banks to reduce their credit offer.
Credit, which had increased at an annual 20%
rate, is now reduced to 7%, with severe conse-
quences for those wishing to renew their credit
lines or fund new projects. In fact, no recovery
can take place without restoring a normal
credit flow.
Finally, there is a crisis of trust that can jeopardise
the end of the economic crisis. A considerable,
yet minority part of the population is directly
affected by the situation: the building and
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building material branch as well as stock
investors caught by American bankruptcies. The
rest of the population, whose income has not
shrunk, has an influence on the economic situa-
tion as it is cutting on consumption and shifting
its priorities regarding expenditure. Fortunately
enough, neither Catalonia nor Spain are under-
going a traumatic political situation associated
to the economic crisis that can be compared to
the proclamation of the Second Republic in the
case of the 1929 crisis and the dictator’s death
and transition to democracy in that of 1973.
As opposed to what occurred during the previous
big economic crises, there is now effective
international cooperation on which to rely.
There is a will as well as institutions, but it is
difficult to guess how this cooperation will be
considered in some years from now – excellent,
good, average or bad? In all developed coun-
tries, measures have been being taken for
some months that were unimaginable not a
long time ago as to direct governmental inter-
ference, attempting out-and-out economic 
liberalism upheld by some. However, nobody
raises any protest against themselves, as 
there is too much at stake. And President 
Roosevelt’s «New Deal» is remembered with
gratitude.
As of now, there are no serious symptoms of
deflation as in 1929, despite the decline in oil
and some raw material prices, which had previ-
ously experienced a considerable increase. But
how prices will evolve in the near future
remains to be seen. The crisis will encourage
policies to reduce oil dependence, especially in
the car industry.
Barack Obama’s presidency may restore confi-
dence in the United States and the world. 
And joint action of governments of the most
developed countries is to be trusted as well,
through either already existing institutions 
– International Monetary Fund, World Bank – or
multilateral agreements between the US, the
EU, Japan, China and other emerging countries.
From our perspective, there are big expecta-
tions for the European Union to play its cards
well: it is the first big economic crisis with this
organisation and the euro as a big international
currency around.
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